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Estimating the Life Cycle Effects of Subjective Survival 







This paper attempts to confirm the life-cycle relationship that lower subjective survival 
probabilities should lead to less positively sloped consumption trajectories.  I use the results of six 
waves of subjective survival probability questions in the HRS to construct an index of survival 
belief that exploits the panel nature of the data by summarizing all of a respondent’s answers to 
such questions.  In conjunction with constructed consumption values from the financial section of 
the HRS, I test the life-cycle relationship using OLS and Least-Absolute Deviation regression.  I 
find weak evidence that the life-cycle effect of subjective survival probability is significant in a 
high-cognitive-ability sub-sample of the HRS.  Measurement error in the constructed 















I.  Introduction 
People’s beliefs about their own life-expectancy have not been extensively studied—
mainly due to lack of data.  It is not clear that people actually have consistent beliefs 
about their future chances of survival at any time.  Even if they do, measuring them in a 
meaningful and convincing way is difficult.  The Health and Retirement Study has been 
attempting to obtain such measurements since 1992.  In each wave of the survey, 
respondents are asked what they think the probability is that they will live to be a specific 
age.  Since these questions began being asked in 1992 several studies have examined the 
question of to what degree respondent’s stated probabilities of survival relate to actual 
survival—this is a question of how informed respondents are about themselves and about 
human life expectancy.  Few studies exist which examine to what extent these subjective 
survival probabilities affect respondents’ decision-making—specifically their financial 
decision-making—as an economist might predict they would.  That is the question under 
examination. 
The life-cycle hypothesis makes a simple prediction about the relationship between a 
person’s perceived survival probability and their consumption:  those who think they are 
more likely to survive will have less consumption growth over time.  Simply put, if you 
expect to live a long time, you will conserve your resources early in life in order to have 
enough later—this means earlier consumption will be lower than it would have been if 
you had thought your chances of survival were worse, ceteris paribus.  In this way, a 
higher expected chance of survival should have the same effect as a higher interest rate or 
a lower degree of impatience.   
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Most attempts to confirm this relationship in the past have been confounded by lack of 
data on people’s perceived risk of death.  Typically, these tests have been based on 
proxies of life-expectation such as parents’ ages of death or life-tables.  Testing this 
implication using life-table mortality rates, Kuehlwein (1993) finds only mixed support 
for this relationship.  Hamermesh (1984) finds some evidence that those who should 
expect to live longer retire later and consume less.  He bases his inference about 
individuals’ expected risk of death on both life-tables and the longevity of individuals’ 
parents.  Both of these studies are vulnerable to the criticism that their proxies for 
individual expectations may not reflect actual individual expectations.  This study’s main 
contribution is to examine a similar question using data that may better represent people’s 
actual survival beliefs because it is obtained directly from them. 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) has elicited subjective life-expectation data 
from its respondents since the study’s inception in 1992 (12 waves of the HRS have been 
completed—1992-2002, every two years).  The questions are of the form “What is the 
percent chance that you will live to be 75 or more?” (the target age—75 in this case—can 
vary).  Several papers have examined the responses to these questions, and a few broad 
facts have been established about them: their mean values over respondents are generally 
close to life-table data; they contain information about respondents’ likelihood of dying 
that the extensive health survey within the study does not capture; respondents’ answers 
to these questions co-vary reasonably with lifestyle indicators of mortality, such as 
smoking; and these answers appear to be updated as new health information arises 
between waves of the HRS. However, the responses vary more than life-table data and a 
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large proportion of respondents answer zero, 50 or 100 percent (Hurd, McGarry 1995, 
2002). 
That these responses broadly agree with life-table statistics, show evidence of updating, 
and reflect lifestyle choice suggests that respondents answer the questions honestly and 
take them seriously.  That the variance is larger than it would be if respondents took their 
response from a life-table suggests error in measurement of expectations or that some 
people are optimistic or pessimistic about their expected longevity as compared to a life-
table.  The existence of so many answers at zero, 50 and 100 also suggests measurement 
error or significant rounding, or that respondents have a high degree of uncertainty about 
the risk of death.  Nevertheless, many of the responses seem quite rational and therefore 
it makes sense to use them, along with other HRS data to test whether respondents’ 
answers affect their financial decision-making.  In particular, because some of the 
subjective survival responses seem sensible and others not, and because the HRS contains 
other data that indicate mental, it makes sense to test whether there is a subset of 
respondents for whom the life-expectation data is sensible and who use those 
expectations to inform their financial decision-making as the life-cycle hypothesis 
predicts.  This follows Hamermesh (1984) again, as he used data from the Terman Study 
of Gifted Individuals in the hope that if anyone would have the capacity to make 
decisions using a life-cycle framework, it would be those people who have larger mental 
capacity. 
This study will be a joint examination of three separate questions:  how well the life-
cycle hypothesis predicts consumption behavior; to what degree HRS respondents (or 
people in general) take seriously the question of predicting their own survival; and to 
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what degree people’s actual beliefs about their mortality risk (whether captured by the 
survey or not) influence their financial decisions.  My main emphasis is on the latter two 
questions; my life-cycle model will be relatively basic.  This point is relevant because the 
biggest shortcoming of this study will be the lack of direct consumption data from the 
HRS respondents.  If the main goal of this paper were to test the life-cycle implication 
independent of using the HRS data, then a better research design would probably be to 
use a survey with a consistent measure of consumption, and then to use a reasonable 
proxy for survival belief—as in the Kuehlwein and Hamermesh papers mentioned above.  
I tolerate the lack of consumption data and the problems it introduces because the main 
goal here is to see whether there is a substantial effect on consumption from people’s 
actual beliefs about their survival probability—not a presumed belief 
In order to test the implication that consumption profiles have a more positive slope for 
respondents who expect to live longer I use the data in the HRS to construct two sets of 
variables for each respondent.  First, I use data on assets, income and capital gains to 
deduce a value of consumption for each respondent for each time-period between survey 
interviews.  This is problematic, as it introduces substantial measurement error.  Second, 
I use all responses that a respondent has given to any of the subjective survival 
probability questions over the 12 waves of the study to calculate a linear survival 
probability profile for each respondent who has answered at least three such questions 
during the study.  This profile is meant to represent the set of survival expectations that 
both reflects the responses given and is smooth and linear.  I then test the hypothesis 
using ordinary least-squares regression and least-absolute deviation regression. 
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I find only weak evidence that the relationship exists in the data.  This may be due to the 
measurement error introduced in the process of calculating consumption, or it may be that 
the relationship actually does not describe respondents’ behavior. 
In Section One I describe the theory that underlies the life-cycle prediction I test.  Section 
Two contains a description of the data and a description of the calculations used to 
produce values of consumption and of expected survival probabilities.  In section three I 
test the life-cycle implication that consumption profiles will be more positively sloped for 
those who have greater subjective survival probabilities.   
II.  Life-cycle Theory 
I use a simplified life-cycle model to produce the implication that I test.  The implication 
that consumption growth should rise with a rise in a person’s mortality risk comes 
directly from the Euler equation of an agent maximizing the sum of additively separable 
utility over his lifetime (my formulation is borrowed from Kuehlwein): 




U C rE p
U C δ
+⎛ ⎞+⋅ ⋅ =⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
. (1) 
Here, p is probability of surviving to the next period, r is the interest rate and δ is the rate 
of time-preference.  Lowering p has the same effect as raising δ  or lowering r—it  
privileges current consumption over future consumption.   
This formulation elides the issue of the utility value of a bequest upon dying.  In this 
study I ignore the possible effects of such a value.  To what degree people actually 
behave based on a desire to leave a bequest is an open question that will not be addressed 
here.  
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I assume a felicity function ( ) CU C
γ
γ
=  (constant relative risk aversion with relative risk 
aversion parameter 1-γ ), and take the logarithm of each side of (1).  Also, because my 
concern is with life-span uncertainty, I assume that the income stream is known.  This 
means that there is no uncertainty about realized consumption in period t+1, given that 
the respondent survives to that period, so I dispense with the expectation operator: 









+⎛ ⎞ = + + − +⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠
. (2) 







 by itC∆ .  Adding a term, u,  to account for measurement error in 
the change in log-consumption gives:   
 1 (log log(1 ) log(1 ))
1it it it i iti
C p r uδ
γ
∆ = + + − + +
−
. (3) 
As written, this equation should apply only to a single agent making decisions for 
himself.  Analyzing a similar case for a multi-person household in which agents care for 
each other’s well-being requires further assumptions about how those agents interact and 
make decisions together.  For the sake of this analysis I need every data point I can get, 
so I show results both for singles and for all households.  When I analyze a household, I 
will assume that the household bases its decisions on the well-being of the member who 
has the highest next-period subjective survival probability.  To do this I will use the 
maximum value of p among the people in the household.  This assumed decision 
structure could certainly be replaced with a different one, but this is relatively 
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straightforward and gives the analysis substantially more power as it increases the 
amount of available data by a factor of four. 
The only variables from (3) that I have measured variation in are consumption and 
subjective survival expectation.  One possibility to get variation in the interest rate is to 
segregate respondents by income-tax bracket thereby dividing people into groups based 
on after-tax interest rate.  I do not do this because it seems unlikely that most respondents 
are actually that sensitive to what their marginal tax rate is or to what the boundaries 
between tax brackets are.  Therefore, I make the possibly unfounded assumptions that the 
difference between log rit and log iδ  is distributed randomly in the population given 
log(pit), and that iγ  is constant (or distributed randomly) throughout the population.  This 
leaves the relationship that I examine: 











+⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠
. 
III.  Data 
The HRS is a nationally representative panel study of persons over 50 in the United 
States.  Beginning in 1992, respondents were interviewed every two years, covering 
health, finances, physical and mental capabilities, family structure and relationships and 
job history.  A study called AHEAD (Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old) 
began in 1993 and focused on older respondents.  In 1996, the AHEAD study merged 
with the HRS.  New cohorts were added to the HRS in 1998 so that the survey would 
remain representative of those over 50.  The last wave of data available for this analysis 
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comes from interviews done in 2002.  I employ all the HRS waves, but I do not use 
AHEAD data that were taken prior to the merger with the HRS. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the population that I will use for this analysis.  For 
each survey wave this population consists of all respondents who answered at least one 
subjective survival question in that wave.  Panel A shows statistics for all those 
respondents, while Panel B shows the same statistics for those respondents who were 
single during that time period.  P(75) and P(85) refer to the mean values of the 
probability responses to the subjective survival questions that ask about target ages of 75 
and 85 respectively1.  These statistics are meant simply to make it clear what the 
population of respondents is like in any particular year.  They cannot be used to make 
accurate inferences about the evolution of households or singles in the HRS population 
over time because those respondents who have a valid answer to at least one subjective 
survival question are a highly non-random group.  This is due to both self-selection (it 
takes a certain mental capacity to give a sensible answer to a probability question) and 
due to survey variation (exactly which sets of respondents have been asked which 
questions has varied over time in the HRS). 
Predictably, the single population has significantly lower assets and income than the 
overall population.  Also, the single population has a higher proportion of females due to 
women having longer life-spans than men.  Finally, the single population generally has a 
slightly lower subjective survival probability—which could simply reflect the strong 
relationship between subjective survival probability and wealth that has been noted 
elsewhere (Hurd, McGarry 1995). 
                                                 
1 P(85) is a misnomer for the 2000 and 2002 waves because in those waves the target age of the probability 
question varied based on respondent age.  This is described in detail later. 
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Measuring Consumption 
Each wave of the HRS contains detailed questions on household assets (both real and 
financial), household income (separate from capital gains), and capital gains.  The survey 
does not contain any consistent measure of household consumption.  In order to test the 
implication of survival expectations on consumption profiles, I use the HRS data on 
assets, income and capital gains to infer a measure of consumption for each respondent 
for each period between survey interviews.   
The basis of the calculation is the relationship: 
 C I CG A= + − ∆ . (5) 
That is, consumption between two measured points in time equals whatever the 
household took in—in earned income and capital gains—minus the amount that their 
asset level grew during that period.  It is ambiguous in the HRS whether respondents give 
pre-tax or post-tax income levels and so there is no way to account for income tax.  I do, 
however subtract property taxes from inferred consumption. 
First, I use the HRS income data to estimate household income over the period between 
survey interviews.  I divide the study’s constructed household income variable—which 
estimates total household income in the one-year period prior to the interview—by twelve 
to get an estimated monthly income and then multiply by the number of months between 
interviews.  This procedure will add measurement error to the extent that actual 
household income during the period between interviews differs from income during the 
period just prior to the interview.  Additionally, all financial variables in the HRS include 
imputed values which increase the level of measurement error, but also substantially 
 11
increase the number of data points available.  To exclude the imputed values from this 
analysis would entail dropping a majority of the available data since almost all 
respondents require imputation on at least one financial variable. 
Second, I use the capital gains section of the survey to estimate capital gains between 
survey interviews.  Respondents are asked whether they have put money in to or taken 
money out of their various assets.  This information, combined with the asset values 
reported in the earlier and later waves, allows for inference of the respondent’s capital 
gains over the period.  This is straightforward except that housing capital gains are not 
well-measured for respondents who buy or sell a house during the period, so those 
respondents are dropped.   
Finally, I calculate respondents’ change in assets between the survey interviews by 
subtracting the later survey-interview household assets variable from the earlier survey-
interview household assets variable.  I do not include housing assets on the assumption 
that people—particularly retired people—do not generally monetize housing assets for 
the sake of consumption.  This assumption is probably alright for the period 1992-2002, 
but may be less true now as mortgage refinancing for consumption seems to have become 
much more common. 
Adding income and capital gains and subtracting asset growth and property taxes, and 
then deflating by the CPI-U yields the measure of consumption in 2002 dollars that is 
used to test the life-cycle prediction.   
Using this strategy I have measures of consumption for the periods between the survey 
waves 1992 and 1994, 1994 and 1996, 1996 and 1998, 1998 and 2000, and 2000 and 
2002.  These five sets of consumption data can be used to calculate four cross-sections of 
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log-consumption growth, the statistic of interest in the Euler equation.  Table 2 shows 
summary statistics for consumption (in 2002 dollars) and log-consumption growth.  Panel 
A shows consumption measured for all households and consumption measured for 
households composed of singles.  Consumption over the measured periods 
(approximately two years) rises from $81K in 1992-1994 to $105K in 2000-2002, but 
with a substantial drop in the prior period to $69K (more on that below).  These means do 
not seem unreasonable for households whose mean yearly income is fairly stable at 
approximately $60K.  Measured consumption for singles is substantially less stable—
rising and falling substantially between each period.  Panel B shows log-consumption 
growth measured for all households and for singles.  For all households and for singles 
mean growth is negative in each of the first three periods and is positive in the last period.   
Two elements of this table suggest large measurement error.  First, in each year a large 
proportion of households have negative values for this measure of consumption—
typically 11-15%. Because actual consumption cannot be negative, these cases are 
necessarily mis-measured.  The proportion of negative cases is a lower bound on the 
proportion of mis-measured cases in each year.  The large number of negative values also 
explains why the number of cases is significantly lower in Panel B than Panel A—if there 
is a negative value in either time t or time t+1, then log-consumption growth cannot be 
measured. 
Second is the fact that, for both the whole population and for singles, measured 
consumption drops substantially for the period 1998-2000 and then rises substantially for 
the period 2000-2002.  This is very likely due to unreported capital gains appearing in the 
change in asset level.  If a respondent had substantial positive capital gains in 1998-2000 
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(as many did), then did not report them as capital gains and did correctly report their total 
assets, this would result in measured consumption being biased downwards.  The reverse 
is likely for the period 2000-2002.  Poorly measured capital gains are probably not 
restricted to these time periods—they just show up strongly in these periods because asset 
values fluctuated substantially. 
One final reason to believe that there is a large amount of measurement error in the 
measure of consumption is the result of a separate study (Perry, 2005, available by 
request) in which I fit the covariance structure of log-consumption growth to three 
possible models of the consumption time-series using the generalized method of 
moments.  The three models are:  a pure measurement error model in which an 
individual’s log-consumption in each period is an individual specific constant plus a 
random shock, uncorrelated with any other variable; a model in which log-consumption 
follows a random walk; and the life-cycle model from equation (4).  The equations 
governing the first two models are 
 ln t i tc c u= +  (6) 
 1ln lnt t tc c u+ = +  (7), 
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Using a 2χ  goodness-of-fit test, I am able to reject the random-walk and life-cycle 
models and unable to reject the measurement error model.  While it is possible that the 
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measurement error model is describing an actual consumption process, rather than 
measurement error, this seems unlikely.  While this result does indicate that the overall 
model fits the data poorly, I persist in order to see whether there is a positive relationship 
between log-consumption growth and p.   
Change in log-consumption is the dependent variable in my analysis.  First-differencing 
of consumption will exacerbate measurement error in levels of consumption. Regression 
coefficient values should not be biased due to random measurement error in the 
dependent variable, but they will be measured less-precisely.  Moreover, I have no 
evidence that measurement error in this measure of consumption is random—to the 
extent that it is not, coefficient values could be biased. 
The HRS does provide a few variables that can be used to corroborate my deduced 
consumption values.  In 1996 and 1998 the survey asked each household what their total 
spending—including all debt payments, utility bills, rent, transportation, entertainment, 
food, clothes and any other expenses—was in the previous month.  Also, in 2002, the 
survey asked three food consumption questions: how much did the household spend in 
the past week on all food; how much did it spend having food delivered; and how much 
did it spend eating out.  The left side of table 3 shows mean values for these measures 
and for my deduced consumption values measured on a monthly basis for the same time 
period.  The levels of total monthly consumption from the HRS survey are substantially 
lower than my calculated values in both 1996 and 1998.  Also included are mean values 
of inferred consumption with negative values removed—this increases the difference 
between the HRS measure and my measure.  It is questionable how accurate a respondent 
is likely to be in making a fast estimate of monthly spending, so there is no guarantee that 
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the HRS measure is very good.  Indeed, given that the average income levels for this 
population in 1996 and 1998 are $64K and $73K respectively, the levels of spending 
implied by the HRS measure seem quite low and would imply a very high average 
savings rate.  One possible, partial explanation for the large difference between the values 
reported by respondents and the calculated values is that I have not accounted for income 
tax.  If respondents generally report pre-tax income, then my calculation will count their 
taxes as consumption.  It seems likely that few respondents would include income tax in 
their response to the 1996 and 1998 HRS consumption question.   
The right side of table 3 shows correlation coefficients and respective significance levels 
between the HRS measures and my inferred levels of consumption for the relevant time 
periods.  For both HRS consumption measures, the correlation is substantially higher 
when the negative cases are removed from the deduced consumption numbers.  This is 
unsurprising as those cases almost certainly represent particularly egregious cases of 
measurement error.  Furthermore, it is encouraging that the inferred consumption shows a 
substantial correlation with the HRS measures of consumption, given the disparate 
measurement techniques and the likely presence of substantial measurement error in both.  
Interestingly, of the food consumption measures in 2002, only the measurement of what a 
family spends eating at restaurants is significantly correlated with my inferred 
consumption measure.  Also interesting, though I have not shown it, is that these 
measures of food consumption correlate very little with each other. 
Table 3 shows that despite its weaknesses, my inference about household consumption do 
match up to a substantial degree with the limited information the HRS survey provides 
about actual household consumption. 
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Measuring Subjective Survival Expectations 
In the Euler equation, p represents the agent’s subjective assessment of his probability of 
living to the next period.  The HRS provides answers to questions of the form “What is 
the percent chance that you will live to be 75 or more?”  These questions are asked twice 
in each survey wave with different target ages, although some respondents may only be 
asked once or not at all.  From 1992 to 1998 respondents were asked the questions with 
75 as a target age, and then with 85 as a target age.  In 2000 and 2002, the first question 
remains the same and the second question has a target age that varies from 80 to 100 in 
five year increments depending on the age of the respondent (the target for anyone under 
70 was 80, for those 70-74 it was 85 and so on).   
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the answers to the “75” question in 2002.  Figure 1 is 
representative of responses in any given year in that a very large proportion of people 
answer 100 or 50 in addition to substantial fractions at 75, 80, and zero.   
Table 4 shows statistics of attributes of people who gave certain answers to P(85) in each 
year of the survey.  Panel A shows the differences between all respondents and those who 
gave an answer of 50 or more and those who answered less than 50.  Those who give 
lower answers are more likely to be male—a fact that squares well with actual mortality 
data.  Additionally, those who give lower answers have less education, fewer assets and 
less income than those who gave higher answers.   
Panel B shows the same statistics for those who gave answers of exactly zero, 50 and 
100.  Because such a high proportion of respondents give these answers and because in 
the case of zero and 100, they are not very sensible answers, it is worth checking whether 
there is something noticeably different about these respondents.  In contrast to the result 
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from panel A, those who answer 100 have less education, fewer assets and less income 
than those who answer 50.  Those who answered zero have less still.  Those who 
answered 50 look essentially the same as the rest of the population.  This suggests that 
answers of zero and 100 may be more a sign of poor understanding of the question than 
of optimism or pessimism.  This conclusion will be used in developing a measure of 
expected next-period survival probability. 
A response to one of these questions does not imply directly any particular value of the 
respondent’s expected chance of living to any particular date other than the target age.  In 
order to use the survey responses to calculate a value of p (in the life-cycle model the 
probability of living to the next period; in this analysis the probability of living through 
the next period of measured consumption) for each respondent, some assumptions are 
necessary. 
For each respondent, I assume that a response to the question “What is the percent chance 
that you will live to be 75 or more?” implies a belief over all the conditional probabilities 
of surviving one year into the future (that is, for example, the probability of surviving to 
age 63 given that the respondent has survived to age 62) for each year from the 
respondent’s current age up to the age of 75.  Assuming that these probabilities exist, the 
response to the question is just the product of all conditional probabilities from the 








= Π . (8) 
Here, R is the survey response, A is the age of the respondent, T is the target age and iρ  is 
the probability of surviving to age i, given that the respondent has survived to age i-1.  In 
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order to calculate values of iρ , it is necessary to assume something about how 
respondents’ beliefs change over time.  I assume that respondents recognize that their 
conditional survival probabilities fall somewhat each year that they age2.  Over the 
relatively short time of a decade, actual life-table survival probabilities decline 
approximately linearly.  For this reason and for simplicity, I assume that iρ  declines by a 
constant amount each year.  This simplifies the expression in (8) to  






= − −Π , (9) 
where m is the amount by which survival probabilities decrease each year and H=T-A.  
Taking logs of both sides gives 
 1
1








= − −∑ . (10) 
Then, set 1 1A rρ + = − .  Actual mortality rates, even for people in their eighties are 
typically below 0.1—meaning that in actual outcome, survival probabilities are quite 
close to one for any given year.  I assume that respondents’ beliefs conform well-enough 
to actual outcomes that I can use the approximation ln(1 )x x− ≅ − , for small x, in 
equation (10).  This yields 
 
1
ln ( ( 1) )
i H
i
R r i m
=
=
= − − −∑  (11) 
 ( 1)( )ln
2
H HR rH m −= − − , (12) 
                                                 
2 This assumption may be reasonable for those respondents who gain no new and significant information 
about their life-expectancy during the relevant time period.  It is almost certainly not reasonable for 
respondents who do receive such information by, for example, suffering a major health shock such as a 
stroke. 
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where equation (12) follows from standard summation results. 
This is the equation I use to describe the relationship between a response and a 
respondent’s beliefs in the first wave of the survey (1992).  Because other responses 
occur at different times and for different target ages, there is variation in the values of H 
and therefore in the multipliers of r and m.  For example, if equation (12) represents the 
relationship between beliefs and response for the question with target age 75, asked in 
1992, then the same relationship for target age 80, asked in 2000 of the same respondent 
looks like: 







= − − +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 (13) 
where 2000,80 8 5 3H H H= − + = − .  The difference in H is due to the respondent’s age 
having advanced eight years between surveys and the target age increasing by five years.  
The addition of 8 to the multiplier on m is due to all conditional survival probabilities 
having declined by 8m as the respondent aged during the time between 1992 and 2000. 
Using these relationships, I have a vector of responses, R, and a matrix of multipliers for 






⎛ ⎞′= +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 (14) 
separately for each respondent, thereby giving values of r and m for each respondent who 
has answered at least three subjective survival questions.  In this formulation, r is the 
respondent’s perceived risk of death in the first year (the first year is set to 1992 for all 
respondents since that is the first year of survey data for any respondents), and, again, m 
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is the yearly increase in risk of death.  Using these numbers, I calculate a respondent’s 
perceived risk of death in year x as riskx=r+(x-1992)m, or equivalently, I calculate their 
perceived probability of survival during year x as px=1-riskx. 
The above explanation ignores the issue that when a respondent answers zero, it is 
impossible to take a log and use that response in the calculation.  I try two strategies to 
deal with this issue and test which seems to work better.  First, I exclude all responses of 
zero from the calculations.  Above, we established that those who answer 100 seem to be 
similar to those who answer zero, and additionally, they seem to be the same sort of 
unlikely answer to a probability question—perhaps due to misunderstanding.  For that 
reason, when I exclude the zeros I also exclude the 100s.  For the second strategy, instead 
of excluding the zeros and 100s, I replace the zeroes with the value 0.00001, which can 
be logged, and I replace the 100s (really 1s since everything is converted to fractions) 
with 0.99999.   
In each case, I use the values of r and m generated for each respondent to calculate the 
respondent’s perceived probability of survival during any year.  These predicted yearly 
subjective survival values can be multiplied together as in (8) to produce predicted 
responses to any of the subjective survival questions on the survey.  To test my two 
strategies, I regress the actual responses on the predicted responses.  The results are 
shown in Table 4.  Strategy 1 drops responses of zero or 100, strategy 2 replaces them.  
The first two sets of R2 values are for regressions over the same responses.  The last set is 
for strategy 2 used to predict for all responses for which it is possible to do so.  The 
number of possible cases using strategy 2 is larger because dropping responses in strategy 
1 necessarily means reducing some respondents to below the three-response level 
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necessary for prediction.  Strategy 1 produces a better set of predicted responses in all 
cases.  This could be because answers of zero or 100 are more likely to reflect confusion 
than information about held beliefs.   
Perhaps needless to say, I do not hypothesize that any respondent has set beliefs about his 
or her conditional probability of surviving during any particular year.  It would be 
claiming too much to say that the HRS questions evoke anything more than a general 
impression of survival probability from most respondents (the exception perhaps being 
any professional actuaries surveyed).  The scheme I propose for integrating all of a 
respondent’s answers is intended to be a fairly straightforward way of approximating 
what a respondent’s well-articulated beliefs might look like if they were forced to 
develop them in a rigorous way and if they had some consistency over time.  Therefore, 
the charge could be leveled that I have invented an index with a dubious epistemic nature.  
My only response is that I see no other simple strategy for incorporating all of a 
respondent’s answers that is not at least as questionable.  It may well be that questions 
like those on the HRS are simply not sophisticated enough to use in testing life-cycle 
models.  
IV.  Results 
To test whether the life-cycle prediction holds I first check to see whether it holds in a 
coarse or general way before I attempt to estimate a precise effect.  As noted above, six 
waves of HRS data yield five periods of consumption data, which in turn can be used to 
produce four data points per respondent of log-consumption growth.  I calculate predicted 
subjective survival beliefs for each respondent corresponding to their belief that they will 
survive from the time of the HRS interview all the way through the next period of 
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calculated consumption.  For example, I have consumption measured for the periods 
1992-1994 and 1994-1996.  This allows me to calculate log-consumption growth for the 
period 1992/1994-1994/1996.  Then, the relevant survival belief to juxtapose with log-
consumption growth from 1992/1994-1994/1996 is the respondent’s belief that they will 
live from the survey interview date in 1994 all the way through their next period of 
measured consumption—which I assume to be the end of 1996.  Therefore I calculate the 
respondent’s subjective belief that he or she will survive through the years 1995 and 
1996.  I do this calculation for each respondent, for each measurement of log-
consumption growth.  I then aggregate the four cross-sections of log-consumption growth 
data and subjective survival probability data into one dataset. 
Figures 2 and 3 shows a scatter plot of the basic data:  log-consumption growth vs. log-
subjective survival belief for households and for singles.  There is no clear relationship, 
but the existence of some very low subjective survival beliefs distorts the abscissa.  
Figures 4 and 5 fix this by showing the same data, with the x-axis truncated below -0.3.  
Again, there is no clear relationship between the sets of points.   
Figures 6 through 9 clarify the relationship somewhat by plotting the mean log-
consumption growth for each decile of log-survival belief (the higher deciles indicate a 
higher subjective survival probability).  In figures 6 and 7 there does appear to be a noisy, 
but positive relationship between the variables as the Euler equation predicts.  However, 
figures 8 and 9—in which the same data is graphed, but including bars showing one 
standard deviation on each side of the mean—show that the log-consumption growth data 
has so much random variation in it that we cannot have any confidence in the relationship 
that figures 6 and 7 show.   
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Regressions of log-consumption growth on log p show similar results:  the sign of the 
relationship is correct, but the significance is too low to have any confidence in the result.  
Table 6 shows the results of OLS regressions of log-consumption growth on log p for the 
entire sample.  The first line of table 6 shows the results when the only independent 
variable is log p.  The second line includes log p, years of education, an indicator for 
white race, and the decile of asset level of the household as regressors (using asset deciles 
instead of asset levels gives very similar results and gives the coefficient much more 
convenient values for reporting).  In both of the first two lines, the sign on log p’s 
coefficient is positive, but not significant at standard significance levels.   
The next two lines show results of the same regressions for a sub-sample selected based 
on cognitive ability.  The HRS includes a sequence in which respondents are read a list of 
20 words and asked to recall as many as possible.  Then, a few minutes later, they are 
again asked to recall as many as possible.  The HRS also includes a set of questions in 
which the respondent is asked “what is 100 minus seven?”, “and seven from that?”, etc.  
With the question repeated three more times.  I have taken the total number of words a 
respondent remembered after being asked each time and the total number of correct 
answers they gave to the “serial 7s” questions to produce a word recall score and a serial 
7s score.  In addition, we know the level of education for the respondents.  I select a sub-
sample of respondents who are above the median on all three cognitive ability measures.   
The reasoning behind this is that the life-cycle hypothesis applies to rational agents 
maximizing lifetime utility.  Presumably, it takes a good deal of cognitive sophistication 
to do this; so perhaps the life-cycle result that we are testing holds for those who are more 
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capable mentally.  The results of the OLS regressions do not bear out this hypothesis.  
Again, the coefficients on log p are positive, but not significant. 
In the second half of the table I perform the same regressions using least-absolute-
deviation (or median) regression instead of least-squares.  I do this to minimize the 
impact of outliers—specifically outliers that may be the result of measurement error due 
to the calculations I used to produce values for consumption and for log p.  The results 
for the entire sample are in the first two lines of the second half of table 6.  Here, again, I 
use log p alone as a regressor, and then log p along with education, race and asset level 
(in deciles).  The results for log p are similar to the OLS regressions:  the coefficient on 
log p is positive but insignificant. 
The results for median-regression restricted to the high-cognitive-ability sample—the last 
two lines of table 6—have positive and significant coefficients on log p with t-statistics of 
2.06 and 2.31 for the unconditional and conditional cases, respectively.  I interpret this as 
weak evidence for the life-cycle hypothesis—weak because it only shows up in these 
rather esoteric specifications. 
One other aspect of the results to note is that the coefficients on log p are considerably 
larger for the high-cognitive ability sub-sample than for the whole sample in all 
specifications.  I offer two possible interpretations of this.  If the results actually indicate 
life-cycle behavior in the whole population, then the coefficient on log p can be 
interpreted as 1
1 γ−
 where 1-γ  is the relative risk-aversion parameter.  Therefore a higher 
coefficient on log p for a population could be interpreted as a lower value of 1-γ  for that 
population—i.e. that population is less risk-averse at the same level of consumption.  For 
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the total population, an approximate value for 1
1 γ−
 is 0.15 and for the high-cognitive 
ability sub-sample is 0.75.  These yield relative risk-aversion parameters of 
approximately 6.7 and 1.3, respectively.  Hall (1988) reports results corresponding to 
values for 1
1 γ−
 ranging from -0.4 to 0.98. The values from this analysis do not seem far 
out of line with those results.  Also, Hurd (1989), in a study on the effects of mortality 
risk on consumption and wealth in the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, estimates 
a relative risk aversion parameter of 1.12—not out of line with the value obtained here 
for the high-cognitive ability sub-sample.   
The second possibility (which I consider at least as likely), also conditional on some life-
cycle behavior actually existing in the population, is that with random measurement error 
in log p, the coefficient on log p will be biased towards zero in a standard regression.  It 
could very well be that the cognitively-able portion of the population is better able to 
produce a survey response that reflects their actual subjective beliefs.  This would mean 
less measurement error in the calculated values of p, and therefore coefficients with 
greater absolute value.  If this were the case, then the coefficient values for the high-
cognitive ability group might better reflect the true parameter values in the population. 
Table 7 repeats the same regressions for single population.  These regressions have 
coefficient values similar to table 6.  The major difference is that the sample size is much 
smaller and hence, standard errors are much larger.  Indeed, the t-statistics for log p are 
never such that we consider the relationship significant for singles.  The feature that the 
coefficients on log p are higher for the high-cognitive ability group remains. 
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As noted in footnote 2, my predicted values for subjective survival beliefs should really 
only reflect the beliefs of those respondents who do not significantly revise their survival 
beliefs during the decade over which these measurements are taken.  An indicator in the 
HRS data for such a revision would be a major health event such as the diagnosis of 
cancer.  I have not dropped those respondents who suffer a major health event because, as 
is apparent in the regression results for singles, I need a very large number of data points 
to get any significant results.  A profitable revision to this work would be to develop a 
more sophisticated method of incorporating all the information in HRS survey on 
respondents’ subjective survival beliefs—a method that could adequately handle major 
revisions to beliefs.  This task should become easier as more waves of survey data 
become available.  For the time being, I can only hope that the effects of revisions do not 
distort my measurements of survival beliefs too much. 
One final major point about the regression results is that in no case is the R2 value above 
1%.  If I have shown weak evidence for life-cycle behavior based on subjective survival 
beliefs, then that relationship explains almost none of the variation in the data.  One 
explanation of that may be measurement error in consumption values.  A major 
shortcoming in the study of subjective survival beliefs on financial decision-making is the 
lack of joint data on survival beliefs and consumption.  Each new wave of the HRS will 
add significant power to this study, though.  As this is being written, the 2004 wave of 
HRS data is forthcoming in the next six months, which should allow for a better 
understanding of whether a real relationship exists between subjective survival beliefs 
and consumption trajectories. 
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V.  Conclusions 
In this paper, I have examined constructed consumption and subjective survival 
probability data to test whether those respondents who believe they are more likely to 
survive have higher growth in consumption.  My constructed subjective survival 
probability data uses a novel process to integrate all subjective survival responses for any 
given respondent into one survival curve.  These curves alone can explain a large amount 
of the variation in subjective survival response and they allow for use in predicting 
subjective survival probability over short periods—which is necessary for estimating life-
cycle effects.  
My constructed consumption data contains a large amount of measurement error.  This 
makes finding any life-cycle effects difficult.  I find weak evidence that such a 
relationship exists in the data for those respondents who are of higher cognitive ability.  I 
also find some evidence that high-cognitive-ability respondents either have a different 
group mean of relative risk aversion than the general HRS population or that they are 
better at articulating their subjective survival beliefs.  The value of this study should 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for HRS Respondents     
       
A:  All Respondents 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
N 11658 10237 9648 9417 15667 14498 
mean age 56 57 59 57 68 67 
%male 45 43 43 38 42 41 
%white 73 75 76 76 78 77 
mean p(75) 65 64 65 65 67 66 
mean p(85) 44 44 48 46 51 50 
mean assets (2002 $K) 174 208 246 255 290 258 
mean annual income (2002 $K) 61 63 64 73 58 58 
        
B:  Single Respondents 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
N 2374 2970 3479 2411 2401 2285 
mean age 56 58 60 63 64 66 
%male 31 35 38 40 41 41 
%white 56 59 60 62 64 64 
mean p(75) 62 62 62 64 64 66 
mean p(85) 43 46 49 48 54 55 
mean assets (2002 $K) 68 86 110 118 140 116 




Table 2:  Measured Consumption and Log-Consumption Growth   
A:  Consumption     
All Households N mean (2002 $K) stand. dev. (2002 $K) %negative 
1992-1994 6888 81 242 15 
1994-1996 6343 82 276 13 
1996-1998 6153 91 463 12 
1998-2000 12565 69 393 13 
2000-2002 11532 105 338 11 
      
Singles N mean stand. dev. %negative 
1992-1994 2040 33 121 19 
1994-1996 1952 46 295 15 
1996-1998 2038 59 311 12 
1998-2000 5698 37 273 14 
2000-2002 5506 66 301 13 
      
B:  Log-Consumption Growth     
All Households N mean stand. dev.    
92/94-94/96 4586 -0.004 1.26  
94/96-96/98 4430 -0.070 1.23  
96/98-98/00 4224 -0.055 1.24  
98/00-00/02 8298 0.060 1.25  
      
Singles N mean stand. dev.   
92/94-94/96 1188 -0.075 1.29  
94/96-96/98 1282 -0.021 1.25  
96/98-98/00 1327 -0.045 1.21  




Table 3:  Comparison of HRS Consumption Measures with Inferred Consumption  
  mean (2002 dollars)   correlations   
1996 (survey) 1722   1996 (inferred) 1996  (inferred, ≥0)
1998 (survey) 1959 1996 (survey) 0.14 0.30 
1996 (inferred) 3682     
1998 (inferred) 4398   1998 (inferred) 1998  (inferred, ≥0)
1996 (inferred, ≥0) 5438 1998 (survey) 0 0.33 
1998 (inferred, ≥0) 6382     
     2002 (inferred) 2002 (inferred, ≥0)
All food (2002 weekly) 86 All food 0 0 
Restaurants 26 Restaurants 0.14 0.18 





Table 4A:  Summary Statistics for Respondents to P(85)   
  N % Male P(85) Age Years Education Assets (nominal $K) Income (nominal $K)
all        
1992 11740 45% 44 56 12.1 136 48 
1994 9524 44% 44 58 12.4 179 54 
1996 8967 43% 48 59 12.5 223 58 
1998 8795 38% 46 58 12.8 244 68 
2000 15227 42% 51 67 12.5 284 57 
2002 14146 41% 50 68 12.6 262 58 
mean 11400 42% 47 61 12.5 221 57 
         
live to 85≥50        
1992 5846 40% 71 55 12.4 154 52 
1994 5003 40% 69 57 12.6 189 56 
1996 5082 40% 71 59 12.7 234 61 
1998 4820 33% 70 58 13.0 272 73 
2000 9713 40% 70 66 12.8 323 62 
2002 8788 39% 70 67 12.8 295 65 
mean 6542 39% 70 60 12.7 245 62 
live to 85<50        
1992 5894 49% 16 56 11.8 119 45 
1994 4567 47% 18 58 12.2 169 51 
1996 3792 48% 17 59 12.3 208 54 
1998 3975 44% 18 58 12.6 209 62 
2000 5514 46% 16 68 12.0 214 47 
2002 5358 46% 16 70 12.2 209 48 






Table 4B:  Summary Statistics for Respondents to P(85)   
  N % Male Age Years Education Assets (nominal $K) Income (nominal $K)
answered 0       
1992 2165 50% 57 10.7 89 36 
1994 1035 41% 59 11.3 136 42 
1996 977 46% 60 11.3 129 42 
1998 852 42% 58 11.8 118 46 
2000 1441 45% 73 11.0 145 33 
2002 1430 42% 74 11.5 154 33 
mean 1317 44% 64 11.3 129 39 
         
answered 100       
1992 1136 42% 56 11.8 121 42 
1994 803 42% 58 11.8 148 49 
1996 1044 41% 60 11.9 163 49 
1998 842 30% 58 12.3 191 59 
2000 1633 38% 66 11.9 261 51 
2002 1480 36% 67 12.0 240 55 
mean 1156 38% 61 12.0 187 51 
answered 50       
1992 1879 43% 56 12.2 159 51 
1994 2049 41% 57 12.4 186 54 
1996 1935 41% 59 12.5 194 55 
1998 1934 35% 57 12.9 297 71 
2000 3692 43% 67 12.6 290 56 
2002 3380 43% 68 12.6 269 58 




Table 4C:  Summary Statistics for Respondents to P(85) (singles only)  
  N % Male P(85) Age Years Education Assets (nominal $K) Income (nominal $K)
all        
1992 2259 31% 43 56 11.9 54 23 
1994 1903 29% 46 58 12.2 83 24 
1996 1904 28% 49 59 12.3 110 30 
1998 1990 28% 48 59 12.6 114 35 
2000 4768 25% 48 70 11.9 152 30 
2002 4635 25% 46 71 12.1 138 30 
mean 2910 28% 47 62 12.2 108 29 
         
P(85)≥50        
1992 1103 27% 73 56 12.2 61 25 
1994 1036 25% 70 58 12.4 86 26 
1996 1107 24% 73 60 12.4 121 37 
1998 1141 25% 72 59 12.8 117 39 
2000 2871 23% 70 69 12.2 168 33 
2002 2671 23% 71 69 12.3 132 33 
mean 1655 25% 71 62 12.4 114 32 
P(85)<50        
1992 1156 35.0% 14 56 11.5 47 21 
1994 867 32.3% 17 58 11.9 79 22 
1996 797 33.8% 16 59 12 93 27 
1998 849 32.9% 16 59 12.3 109 31 
2000 1897 26.5% 13 72 11.6 128 25 
2002 1964 26.8% 13 73 11.9 130 27 








Table 4D:  Summary Statistics for Respondents to P(85) (singles only)  
 N % Male Age Years Education Assets (nominal $K) Income (nominal $K) 
answered 0       
1992 496 38.9% 56 10.6 31 16 
1994 234 23.9% 58 11.1 48 16 
1996 218 33.9% 60 11.2 69 21 
1998 207 30.0% 59 11.6 68 21 
2000 641 23.4% 76 10.8 88 20 
2002 702 22.2% 77 11.4 121 22 
mean 416 28.7% 64 11.1 71 20 
        
answered 100       
1992 253 23.3% 56 12.1 25 18 
1994 199 24.6% 58 11.6 58 19 
1996 276 23.9% 60 11.7 88 23 
1998 256 22.3% 59 12.2 58 26 
2000 547 23.0% 69 11.4 121 26 
2002 524 22.7% 69 11.6 73 28 
mean 343 23.3% 62 11.8 71 23 
       
answered 50       
1992 329 31.3% 56 12.0 92 26 
1994 413 26.4% 58 12.4 106 31 
1996 394 26.6% 60 12.2 87 29 
1998 438 26.7% 59 12.8 153 47 
2000 1174 22.6% 71 12.1 149 29 
2002 1087 25.1% 71 12.1 129 31 




Table 5: R-squared values for 
Regressions of Actual on 
Predicted Responses      
   Strategy 1 Strategy 2  Strategy 2 on all eligible cases 
    R2 R2 N R2 N 
1992 P(75) 69 46 6396 49 8310 
 P(85) 50 35 6561 51 8382 
        
1994 P(75) 60 39 6390 44 8446 
 P(85) 55 38 6828 49 8141 
        
1996 P(75) 51 35 5601 44 8074 
 P(85) 61 44 6369 52 7879 
        
1998 P(75) 50 36 6139 41 8320 
 P(85) 70 52 6246 56 7400 
        
2000 P(75) 50 35 5761 41 7585 
 P(85) 45 37 7314 44 9372 
        
2002 P(75) 44 31 4776 38 6288 




Table 6:  Regression Results for Log-Consumption Growth on log-p   
  constant p education white asset decile N R-squared 
Coefficient 0.01 0.11    14886 <1% 
Std. Error (0.01) (0.13)      
         
Coefficient -0.04 0.11 0.005 0.04 -0.010 14191 <1% 
Std. Error (0.05) (0.14) (0.004) (0.03) (0.004)   
         
  Top Half of Word Recall, Serial 7s and Education    
  constant p education white asset decile     
Coefficient 0.10 0.74    1065 <1% 
Std. Error (0.05) (0.56)      
         
Coefficient -0.06 0.70 0.001 0.17 -0.0016 1065 <1% 
Std. Error (0.41) (0.57) (0.027) (0.10) (0.017)   
         
  Median Regression Log-Consumption Growth on log-p   
  constant  p education white asset decile     
Coefficient 0.02 0.15    14886 <1% 
Std. Error (0.01) (0.10)      
         
Coefficient -0.02 0.19 0.01 0.01 -0.01 14191 <1% 
Std. Error (0.04) (012) (0.003) (0.021) (0.004)   
         
  Top Half of Word Recall, Serial 7s and Education       
  constant p education white asset decile   
Coefficient 0.15 0.78    1065 <1% 
Std. Error (0.03) (0.38)      
         
Coefficient 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.16 0.00 1065 <1% 




Table 7:  Regression Results for Log-Consumption Growth on log-p (singles only)  
  constant p education white asset decile N R-squared 
Coefficient 0.00 0.15    3909 <1% 
Std. Error (0.03) (0.21)      
         
Coefficient 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.01 -0.02 3740 <1% 
Std. Error (0.09) (0.22) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)   
         
  Top Half of Word Recall, Serial 7s and Education    
  constant p education white asset decile     
Coefficient 0.01 0.52    632 <1% 
Std. Error (0.07) (0.66)      
         
Coefficient -0.30 0.80 0.02 0.24 -0.02 590 <1% 
Std. Error (0.58) (0.69) (0.04) (0.13) 0.02   
         
  Median Regression Log-Consumption Growth on log-p   
  constant  p education white asset decile     
Coefficient 0.02 0.11    3909 <1% 
Std. Error (0.02) (0.15)      
         
Coefficient 0.05 0.20 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 3740 <1% 
Std. Error (0.06) (0.15) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)   
         
  Top Half of Word Recall, Serial 7s and Education       
  constant p education white asset decile   
Coefficient 0.05 0.69    632 <1% 
Std. Error (0.06) (0.61)      
         
Coefficient -0.34 0.74 0.03 0.13 -0.02 590 <1% 
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Figure 8:  Mean Log-Consumption Growth by Decile of Log-Survival Probability 






















Figure 9:  Mean Log-Consumption Growth by Decile of Log-Survival Probability 
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